MTA-STS does not protect what you send

MTA-STS does not protect what you send

You may have published SPF, DKIM and DMARC. You have therefore settled the question of who is allowed to write in your name. You have settled nothing at all about whether your messages travel encrypted, or whether someone can deprive you of that. Two standards address...
In May the IETF wrote that nobody uses ARC

In May the IETF wrote that nobody uses ARC

There is a protocol that has been presented for seven years as the solution to the oldest problem in email authentication. It has a serious name, an RFC, and the backing of Google, LinkedIn and Valimail. In May 2026 the IETF published the new DMARC standard. It...
Your logo does not depend on you

Your logo does not depend on you

Someone will sell you a certificate. They will explain that it makes your logo appear in the inbox, and that this appearance buys trust, therefore opens, therefore revenue. All of that may happen. None of it depends on you. The mechanism is called BIMI, and the only...
BIMI requires a setting the standard deleted

BIMI requires a setting the standard deleted

Sometimes a standard and its usage drift apart slowly, without anyone noticing. In email there is one case where the divergence is total, documented on both sides, and perfectly visible: you only need to read two documents published four months apart. The first...
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